With the advent of Groupon.com in 2008, daily deal platforms have seen phenomenal growth.
Introduction
Daily deal business models came to limelight with the advent of Groupon in 2008 which became the fastest online business to reach one billion dollar valuation in history (Steiner, 2010) . Though online daily deal industry is considered to be only in its fourth year (Dholakia, 2012 ) of evolution, it is estimated that consumers will spend $ 3.6 billion on daily deal websites in 2012, an increase of nearly 87% over 2011 spend (Rueter, 2012) and around 60% of all online shoppers subscribe to a daily deal website in the US (Freed & Berg, 2012) . While daily deal industry has seen phenomenal growth in the last four years, market analysts have raised concern about its sustainability, growth and profitability (Clifford & Miller, 2012 ) and business models pursued by these websites have been questioned (Cohan, 2012; Etter & McMillan, 2012) .
Coupon industry has been around for more than a century in the US (Slater. 2001) and with the advent of the Internet, digital coupons (coupons offered online) have outpaced printed coupons by 10 to 1 in the year 2010 (Kruger, 2010) . It is estimated that shopper's saved more than $3.7 billion dollars in 2010 through the use of coupons (NCH, 2011) . Though the daily deal websites are similar to coupons in that the daily deals also provide discounts, there are some key differences. First, deals offered on daily deal websites like Groupon.com or LivingScoial.com often offer discounts of more than 50% while traditional coupons are more heterogeneous with relatively lower discount rates and many times coupons have a dollar value. Second, daily deals offered by these websites have to first purchase by the consumer and then used to get the service or product from the merchant and these deals are non-refundable. On the other hand a coupon or a voucher, digital or printed, is redeemed only at the point of purchase. Third, daily deals are offered on a platform and the consumer purchases the deal from the platform. The merchant shares a significant proportion (often more than 50% of the value) of the deal value with the platform. Fourth, while daily deal websites have characteristics of a two-sided platform, traditional coupon distributors like PennySaverUSA or PennySaverUSA.com facilitate delivery of coupons or vouchers to the prospective consumers.
Given these key differences, it is not clear as why merchants offer huge discounts on daily deal websites. What framework the platform and merchants should use to determine the payoffs? Should merchants offer higher discounts on daily deal websites compared to coupons through traditional channels? Can offering a deal on the daily deal website be profitable for a merchant? How does the profitability of these deals vary with merchant characteristics? What types of merchants join these websites? What are the tradeoffs that a merchant needs to consider in offering a deal on these platform? What is the optimal discount rate that a merchant should offer? Should daily deal platform subsidize consumers and merchants to join the platform? Should daily deal platform offer a fixed fee contract or a revenue sharing contract? In this paper, we develop a model, first to our knowledge that takes into account the twosidedness of the daily deal platform, with merchants who are heterogeneous in market size and consumers who have heterogeneous taste for quality.
In our model, consumers can transact with merchants through the daily deal platform or outside the platform, though outside the platform less number of consumers know about the merchant. Two key aspects of our conceptualization are: First, unlike most of the theoretical work in Economics and Marketing in the two-sided platform literature which assumes that the two sides can transact with each other only through the platform (Rochet & Tirole, 2003) , in our setting merchants and consumers can transact outside the platform too. In this sense, merchants actions on the platform impact his revenue outside the platform. Second, daily deal website has large number of consumers as registered members and by offering a deal on the daily deal platform the merchant is able to access larger market. We term this expansion in market size as advertizing effect.
Merchants sell an experience good whose true quality is revealed to a consumer only after consumption (Nelson, 1974; Milgrom & Roberts, 1986) . We develop a two-period model similar to Bils (1989) where merchants offer discounts on the daily deal platform as well as outside the platform to first-time consumers and extract surplus in the second period. Our modeling approach is also similar to models of introductory offers of Shapiro (1983) and Bagwell (1990) . Merchants are heterogeneous in market size that is the number of consumers who know about the merchant, and without loss of generality, consumers form a priori expectation about the quality of good based on merchant characteristic. This conceptualization is similar to the treatment of advertizing by daily deal websites like Groupon in Edelman et al., (2010) where some consumers are simply not aware about the merchant's existence but is different from Shapiro (1983) where some consumers over-estimate the quality of the good. In our setting consumers consistently underestimate the quality of the good and realize the true quality only upon consumption. This is justified in our context because a merchant whose product has been overestimated by the consumers will never offer a deal and excluding all such merchants does not impact our results. Since consumers underestimate the true quality of the product, daily deal platform allows merchant to offer discounts at a different rate to the consumers on the platform which captures the sampling effect of the platform.
We model the cross-side network effects on the lines of Yoo et al., (2003) and Bakos & Katsamakas (2008) where consumers are heterogeneous in network externality. Similar to Rochet and Tirole (2006) , the daily deal platform drives benefit from membership on both sides, that is merchants and consumers, but there are only pure membership externalities and gains from interaction between merchants and consumers arises only when a transaction takes place.
Note that our daily deal platform is a monopolist and therefore, we do not allow for any multihoming.
Our analysis on merchants' decision to offer a deal on the platform provides some interesting insights: 1) merchants should always offer higher discount rate on the daily deal website than outside the website, 2) the merchants' choice of optimal discount rate is independent of the daily deal platform's fixed fee contract, 3) merchants with lower consumer awareness and high uncertainty about the quality of the goods will gain more from offering a deal on the platform, 4) some merchants will never offer a deal on the platform even if the platform charges zero fixed fee. We also show that the daily deal website's optimal fixed fee depends on the characteristics of cross side network externality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2, we present the model. In §3, we examine the optimal discount rate offered by a merchant of a particular type and revenue to the merchant in the base case where there is no daily deal website. In §4, we present the model of daily deal website and analyze optimal discount rates offered by heterogeneous merchants and optimal fixed fee announced by the platform. In §5, we discuss our results and identify suitable theoretical and managerial implications.
Model
We consider a monopolist daily deal website as a two-sided platform which connects to merchants on one side and consumers on the other side. We assume a given mass, m N and c N of potential participants for the merchants and consumers. The merchants and consumers who join the daily deal website enjoy network externality from the participants in the opposite side, which makes the daily deal website a two-sided platform. The network externality can mean increased variant of the goods or the increasing probability of matching consumers to merchants' offering (Bakos & Katsamakas 2008) . We consider merchants and consumers are heterogeneous with regard to their valuation of the network externality benefit, with corresponding types c g and m g for the consumer and merchant side, where
and
. The platform set m f and c f as the participation prices that merchants and Merchants and consumers also enjoy benefit from transacting on the platform besides the network externality. We consider the consumers are heterogeneous in taste for quality of the good. The consumer taste parameter, θ , is their private information though it's distribution which is uniform on support 0 to 1, that is
, is common knowledge. Each consumer can buy one good or nothing from merchants in each period. A consumer buys the good only if he derives non-negative surplus from purchase of the good. 1 When a consumer of type θ considers purchasing a good of expected quality q  , his expected utility is ( )
The merchants sell one experience good which may be a product or a service. The true quality of the good is q which is exogenously given, and without loss of generality merchants' marginal cost of good is normalized to zero. Merchants are heterogeneous in terms of consumers' awareness about the merchant and the heterogeneity is captured by a parameter
, which is common knowledge. It implies that consumers as well the platform knows the value of the parameter δ and there is no information asymmetry. Further, though the merchant type δ is public information, it is non-verifiable, and therefore, non-contractible. In order to keep the model tractable, we assume that parameter δ captures two characteristics of the merchant. For a merchant of type δ , the market size or proportion of potential consumers is δ , and consumers' a priori expectation of quality of merchant's good is [ | ] E
Note that a merchant with higher δ has larger market size and also has closer expected quality of the good to the true quality. Furthermore, we consider that consumers' and merchants' decisions to participate the daily deal website platform are independent from consumers' knowledge about the merchants and merchants' characteristics.
Merchants gain exposure to consumers who did not know the merchants by participating the platform. Consumers who participates the platform can observe the characteristic d of all merchants on the other side of the platform. The proportion of the consumers who are on the platform is highlighted in grey circle in Figure 1 . For those consumers who had known the merchant of type d, their a priori expectation of the quality is
They are the existing consumers and highlighted in green circle in Figure 4 .
For those consumers who were not aware of the merchant of type d, their a priori expectation of the quality is
. Those consumers are the new consumers that a merchant does not access to in the absence of the platform. The proportion of these new consumers is highlighted by the overlapping part between the green and grey circle. The platform characteristic b is exogenous parameter which may represent the state of the technology of the platform which facilitates the merchants to communicate the good's quality to consumers. Greater b implies that new consumers form a higher expectation about the quality, though their expected quality is always less or equal to the expectation of the existing consumers.
Figure 1: Expansion of consumer base
Daily deal website serves as a two-side platform which connects merchants and consumers. Since merchant type δ is non-verifiable, the platform 2 cannot write merchant type contingent contracts. Platform can generate revenue from two sources: (a) participation prices by either side or both sides, and (b) a fixed fee for merchants to offer a deal on the platform. The platform maximizes these two revenue sources independently.
The sequence of the two-period game is that the merchants and consumers decide to join the platform before the first period. At the beginning of the first period, merchants release new experience goods of quality q and decide the price and discount rate, while consumers form a priori expectations about the quality and decide to purchase based on merchants' characteristic d . Consumers who bought the experience goods find out the true quality q , while consumers who did not buy maintains the same quality expectation in the first period. Merchants only sell the experience goods at a full price in the second period and consumers will decide to purchase in the second period. Thus, the utility for a θ type consumer given the merchant's awareness characteristic d in the second period is:
, if has not bought it ( , | ) , if bought it before
2 We use the term "daily deal website" and "platform" interchangeably.
No platform:
Platform:
1 st period 2 nd period
We will consider the base case where the daily deal website platform is absent to examine the merchant's optimal pricing and discount strategy in section 4. We turn to the case where the daily deal website services as a platform of connecting merchants and consumers and discuss the platform's optimal access pricing strategy in the section 5. We will summarize the key finds, discuss the implications of the results and offer managerial recommendations in the section 6.
Base Case: no platform
To better understand the effect of selling the experience goods in a discounted price by the merchants, we consider consumers and merchants are connected via traditional channels in the absence of the platform in the base case. In the period zero, no consumer in the market knows about the true quality of the experience good that is offered by merchants. Thus consumers form expectation about the quality based on merchants' awareness characteristic. In the first period, the merchants offer a discount rate, base d , to price, 1 p , and then consumers make purchase decision. The consumers who bought the goods find out the true quality of the good, ( ) E= , while others' expectation of the quality is still based on merchant's awareness characteristics. In the second period, the merchants offer no discount on price, 2 p , and then consumers make purchase decision. The merchants commit to the same price in both periods,
And merchants' awareness characteristics do not change over these periods. Consumer uncertainty about quality of the goods and coupon's sampling effect In Shivendu & Chellappa (2005) , the match between product and consumer tastes is not only known a priori, thus the true value of an experience good is only known after consumption.
However, in their model, the uncertainty lies in consumer and product fit, over and under estimation for the valuation both are possible whereas in our model, the uncertainty lies in the quality of the experience good, such that expectation is always less to the true quality. This is referred as the pessimistic case in Shapiro (1983) , which also assumed that all consumers have the same expectation of quality. It is optimal to have a two-step regime which makes an introductory offer lower than the full price in the first period and benefit from additional and more informed consumers in the second period (Shapiro 1983 
All proofs are in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 is consistent with the Shapiro (1983)'s account of the two-step pricing regime which consists of a lower introductory price in the first period followed by a higher price in a market where consumers are pessimistic about the quality of experience goods. It is easy to see that the consumers who bought the good in the first period also buy in the second period and the demand is half of the market for both periods. The consumers' uncertainty about the quality translates to a discount on their willingness-to-pay and a reduction of the price by the same proportion.
Furthermore, merchant's the optimal discount rate decreases and the optimal revenue increases if the consumers' uncertainty about the quality of the quality, 1 d -, decreases.
Merchant's optimal price is independent of his characteristic d and optimal discount rate of the first period is 1 d -in the case where there is no platform. It implies merchants should set the price as the optimal price as if all consumers know about the true quality of the goods q . It maximizes the revenue in the second period. More importantly, merchants use the discount rate to offset the consumers' uncertainty about the quality based on the merchant characteristic d in the first period, so that the consumers that would have bought the goods in the case of no uncertainty about the good's quality will buy in both the first and second period.
In the Presence of Platform
In the presence of the platform, merchants can join the platform to gain access to a large consumer base. Similarly, consumers can join the platform to face a larger assortment of merchants. Most of the literature (Armstrong, Tirole, Yoo et al. Bakos, etc) either bundle the membership benefit with the transaction benefit or only consider the membership benefit. In this paper, we consider the case where merchants and consumers make decision of participating in the platform independently from the transaction benefit for the following reasons.
Consumers and merchants can be active users of the platforms only if the consumers and the merchants can derive positive surplus from transacting on the platform. It is for tractability.
Consumers do not gain any valuation for additional consumer consumption of the goods. The externality only exists in membership but not in transactions. (more….)
Consumers who join the platform before the first period can observe all merchants on the platform and thus potentially buy goods from them. The consumer base of the merchants who participate in the platform is the total number of consumers who also participate in the platform and consumers who are not on the platform but knew the merchants. The consumers who are on the platform but did not know the merchants before are considered new consumers acquired for the merchants while the consumers who are on the platform and knew the merchants before are existing consumers. These newly acquired consumers form lower expectation about the quality based on the merchant's awareness characteristic than the existing consumers. Both the new and the existing consumers buy the good from the d type merchant only if they derive non-negative surplus based on the expectation of the quality in the first period. And these consumers who bought the goods will find out the true quality before the second period. Consumers maintain the same expectation about the quality if they did not purchase in the first period. Therefore, in the second period, consumers decide to purchase if they derive non-negative surplus based on the expectation of the quality for those did not purchase it or on the true quality for those bought it in the first period. The sequence of decisions by the platform, merchants and consumers in the presence of platform is illustrated in 
Membership decision by merchants and consumers:
Merchants and consumers decide to participate in the daily deal website platform independently from their likely gain from transactions on the platform. Consumers are motivated to join the platform because there are also a large number of merchants on the platform which presents a large assortment of goods. The benefit associated with an additional merchant to a consumer can be understood as large variety of goods.
Consumers and merchants are heterogeneous in transportation cost of participating in the platform in Yoo, et al. (2003) . However, we see it is not a good match to the daily deal website where transportation cost is significantly reduced by the wide use of internet and availability of auxiliary services provided by the website. We consider the model in Bakos Does not know about δ type merchant, not on platform
Does not knows about δ type merchant, but on the platform 
, it implies that one side has a dominant cross-side network externality over the other side. Thus, it reaches the limiting case when merchants' valuation for consumers is much more than consumers' valuation for merchants and it leads to an equilibrium that all merchants and half of the consumers will participate in the platform, and the optimal membership fee is zero for consumers and is a function of total number of consumers and strength of cross-side network externality for merchants. Readers can find the complete proof for the equilibrium in (2) in Bako (2008).
Merchants' benefit of offering a deal on the platform
Merchants made independent decision whether to offer a deal for merchants and similarly consumers make purchase decision independently. It implies that consumers and merchants who participate in the platform may not transact on the platform. We assume that the platform only allows transactions if merchants offer a deal with a discount rate
Merchants who joined the platform may find it unprofitable to offer a deal with a discount rate p d on the platform as they incur revenue loss from the existing consumers. Therefore, merchants only offer a deal if it is more profitable than selling the good via the traditional channel which is depicted in the base case. Similarly, consumers who are attracted onto the platform may find the deal is not attractive and choose not to purchase on the platform.
A merchant can offer a deal with a discounted price on and outside the platform, thus generate revenue from consumers both on and outside the platform. 
, where _ 1
n is the number of the consumers on the platform and f is the fixed fee for offering a deal on the platform.
For tractability, we assume that the merchants adopt consistent pricing strategy on and outside the platform that
and the existing consumers' uncertainty about the quality of the product is ( )
From Lemma 1, it is easy to see that the merchant should set the discount rate d to 
As illustrated in Figure 5A , when 1 0 2 The Proposition 1 says that the optimal discount rate is bounded in a feasible region. The merchant balances the gain in revenue in the second period and also loss in the first period with subject to the relative mass of new and existing consumers on the platform. Any discount rate outside that feasible region will result in sub-optimal revenue for the merchant.
Lemma 2: When offering a deal on the platform is free, the optimal discount rate on the platform offered by a merchant of type d is
, where
The optimal discount rate outside the platform for all merchants of type d is
We show that the merchant's discount strategy is independent from the fixed fee charged by the platform. This implies that the merchants optimal discount rates on and outside the platform is invariant from the platform's fixed fee contract. Lemma 2 also says that for those merchants whose d is relatively small, the optimal discount rate is
, while for those merchants whose d is moderate, the optimal discount rate on the platform is
, and for those merchants whose d is relatively large, the optimal discount rate on the platform is
A relatively small d implies a little mass of existing consumers and thus, the revenue gain from the existing consumers in the first period does not compensate the revenue loss from the new consumers in the second period by decreasing discount rate from
. It only makes sense for the merchant to decrease the discount rate from
when there is a greater mass of existing consumers ( d is relatively large), and the optimal discount rate is
merchant's optimal discount rate outside the platform is
which is identical in the base case.
The optimal discount rates with respect to b are illustrated in Figure 6 . The left graph of the Figure 6 illustrates the case where . The d % corresponds to the marginal merchant whose optimal discount rate is such that none of the new consumers will purchase the good in either of the two periods. The right graph of the Figure 6 depicts the case where 1 2 b > , and the optimal discount rate, The proposition 2 implies that the merchant should offer a higher discount rate to induce the consumers, especially the new consumers, to buy the experience goods in the first period, so that it leads to maximum revenue from both the new and existing consumers in the second period. It is consistent the antidotal evidence that merchants who offer deals on daily deal website may incur a loss in the short run but they expect consumers will return even without coupons in the long run. It always holds as long as the merchant characteristic d is less than 1.
After substituting the optimal discount rates on the platform and outside the platform and the optimal price into the revenue function (3), we get the optimal revenue of the merchant of offering a deal on the platform as * deal R . When a merchant does not offers any deal on the platform, the revenue is identical to the optimal revenue in the base case where the merchant maximizes only the revenue from the existing consumers via the traditional channel, thus,
The optimal revenues of a merchant who offers a deal and no deal are illustrated in Figure 7 . Any merchant whose d is below the threshold d will set the discount rate as
on the platform, as any further increase in discount rate will not lead to any increase in the second period revenue but only decrease the first period revenue. The left graph of the Figure 7 illustrates the case where 1 2 b < , where the merchant of the threshold d type
will set the optimal discount rate as The Proposition 3 says about merchants' motivation of offering a deal does not outweigh the revenue loss from the existing consumers when the new consumers have a significantly high uncertainty about the quality of the experience goods. The great revenue loss from the existing consumer by offering a higher discount rate cannot be compensated by the gain from the new consumers. Therefore, those merchants will offer no deal on the platform even when it is free to offer deal on the platform.
5.
Platform Fee strategies of charging merchants
The merchants can gain from offering a discount on the full price to induce both the new and existing consumers to purchase in the first period and find out the true quality of the experience goods. It leads to maximum revenue for the merchants in the second period where consumers who experienced the goods in the first period make purchase decision based on the true quality of the goods and the full price. In that sense, the daily deal website is not only a two-sided platform which connects the two sides of participants, but also facilitates sampling and advertising effect of offering deals by merchants.
A fixed fee contract
The platform could have implemented a customized contract which specifies the amount of fixed fee F as the gain of offering a deal on the platform by the merchant 3 , if the merchant characteristic d is contractible. We can easily see from Figure 8 that the gain of offering a deal compared to offering no deal increases as merchant characteristic d decreases.
Therefore, the fixed fee F for a merchant of type d is:
It is the first best strategy to charge different fixed fee for merchants according to their characteristic. However, the merchant characteristic d is not contractible and the platform has to decide a fixed fee contract F for all merchants to maximize the revenue. The platform's revenue function from the fixed fee for offering a deal is:
where m n is the total number of merchants who participated on the platform, and m q is the proportion of merchants who offer a deal.
In order to get the proportion of merchants who offer a deal, we consider the marginal merchant with ( ) F d % who are indifferent from offering a deal or no deal on the platform given a fixed fee F . In order words, the marginal merchant is the ( ) F d % type who derive zero benefit from offering a deal after paying the fixed fee f to the platform, 
Since we showed that merchants with lower d gain more by offering a deal on the platform, any merchant whose d is less than the marginal ( ) F d % will offer a deal on the platform. And furthermore
and then is from Thus, the proportion of merchants who will offer a deal is ( )
. The Lemma 3 says that lower proportion of merchants will offer a deal on the platform as the fixed fee increases. The threshold 1 F corresponds to the case where all merchants who will offer a deal set [ , ]
The proportion of merchants who offer a deal on the platform is illustrated in Figure 8 .
The left graph depicts the case where 1 2 b > and the merchant with very high d will always gain by offering a deal to maximize revenue from both the new and existing consumers. Thus, all merchants join the platform, 1 m q = at 0 F = and the proportion of merchants who offer a deal decreases as fixed fee increases. The middle graph depicts the case where b is moderate, and some merchants with high d will not offer a deal on the platform even when the fixed fee is zero. It is because for those merchants it is never optimal to maximize revenue from both the new and existing consumers by offering a deal on the platform which we explained in Proposition 3. The right graph depicts the case where b is very small, that all the merchants who would like to offer a deal will always set the discount rate as The platform maximizes the fixed fee revenue from transactions in (5). The platform needs to balance the effect of fixed fee on the number of merchants who will offer a deal and also on the amount of fee per merchant.
Proposition 5: When the platform charges a fixed fee from the merchants who offer a deal then (i) only the merchants of type
will offer a deal
"The marginal merchant corresponding to this optimal F will offer 1-bd as discount rate, which implies, all merchants who will offer a deal on the platform will offer discount rate as 1-bd. It clearly screen out the high type merchants who may have good number of transactions and good price, but gain little from offering a deal on the platform" Lemma 4 illustrates the platform's balancing the number of the merchants who are willing to offer a deal on the platform and the fixed fee per merchant depends on the number of consumers on the platform, the strength of the cross-side network externality, and the new consumers' uncertainty about the quality of the experience goods on the platform. 
A revenue sharing contract
The platform can also adapt a strategy of sharing a percentage of revenue per transaction. Groupon.com normally has a revenue sharing agreement with merchants such that Groupon.com collects sale of deals and only passes the 50% to the merchants. In other words, Groupon will take 50% of the revenue.
The platform will take a percentage, s , per transaction from merchants in the first period. The platform's revenue from a merchant is: Thus, the merchant's optimization problem in (3) becomes: 
, and The merchant's profit is impacted by the platform's revenue sharing strategy, s .
However, we notice that the merchant's optimal discount rate outside the platform is independent of the platform's revenue sharing strategy, s , such as
explains the merchant's revenues of offering no deal under the fixed fee and revenue sharing regimes are the same, e.g.
The merchant's optimal discount rate will increases as the revenue sharing percentage, s , increases. In Figure 11 , Proposition 3 holds even when the platform adopts a revenue sharing strategy. The marginal merchant, s d % , has the same profits of offering deal or no deal, thus will 
, and where 2 [0, )
. 
Furthermore, the marginal merchant when We can see that 2 2 0.618 0 1
. It implies that even when the platform extracts all of the 1 st period revenue from merchants, some merchants whose
will offer a deal on the platform. < % will offer a deal as they can get higher profit by offering a deal than no deal when the platform adopts a revenue sharing strategy.
By announcing a revenue sharing strategy, s , the platform will attract merchants whose
< % to offer a deal. And thus, the platform's revenue function from the fixed fee for offering a deal is:
where m n is the total number of merchants who participated on the platform, and 
In Lemma 7, the platform's optimal revenue sharing percentage, 
Discussion
In this paper, we developed a stylized game model to capture the daily deal website's strategic interaction between merchants and consumers as a two-side platform. Different from other two-sided platform study, we examine not only the daily deal website's access pricing strategy on membership, but also the pricing strategy on transactions by merchants and consumers. We focus on the daily deal website' role of facilitating sampling and advertising effects in a two-period game setting where the merchants can offer a deal to induce both the new and existing consumers to purchase the experience goods in the first period so that it leads to maximum revenue for both types of consumers who find out the true quality of the goods as the merchants charge the full price on the second period.
We showed that the merchants should always offer a steeper discount on the daily deal website than on other traditional channel regardless the consumers' awareness about the merchant and uncertainty about the quality of the goods. It lends support to the existing practice of offering significant discount on daily deal websites, like Groupon and Livingsocial.
We also showed that the merchants' discount decision is independent from the daily deal website's fixed fee contract.
We discussed the merchants' decision to join the daily deal website and offer a deal on the website. The decision to offer a deal on the platform depends on the new consumers'
uncertainty about the quality of the goods. Merchants who are well-known and their existing consumers have little doubt about the quality of their goods will not offer a deal on the daily deal website if the newly acquired consumers have high uncertainty about the quality of the goods even when the platform charges zero for offering a deal. Furthermore, the merchants with lower consumer awareness will gain more from offering a deal on the daily deal website given a fixed fee contract by the website.
We also examined the platform's optimal fixed fee contract through the lens of twosided platform. We showed that the optimal fixed fee depends on the number of consumers on the platform, the strengths of the cross-side network externality and the new consumers'
uncertainty about the quality of the experience goods as the daily deal website has to balance the number of merchants who are willing to offer a deal on the website and the fixed fee paid per merchant.
Our results offer some insights on daily deal website industry which is still considered a new industry. One of managerial recommendation is that the daily deal website should reduce the new consumers' uncertainty about the quality of the experience goods. It may be carried by providing consumer reviews about the merchants to the new consumers who did not the merchants. Another managerial recommendation is that the daily deal website should have customized contract with merchants as we showed that the merchants' incentive to offer a deal depends on consumer awareness about the merchants and uncertainty about the quality of the goods. The market is more efficient if the daily deal website can contract on those merchants' characteristics.
Our stylized two-period game has some limitations. We do not consider the competition effect on daily deal websites' strategy. Competition between rival daily deal website will potentially exert upward pressure on discount rate. We also assume away the same side negative network externality effect, particularly among the merchants.
We can study the daily deal website's optimal contract structure based on merchants' characteristics as future extension of the paper. Furthermore, we can study the daily deal website's the impact of membership fee structure on his optimal fixed fee contract on transactions by the merchants. 
Appendix A: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
* * (1 ) 4 c base N R q R d = = + .
Proof of Lemma 1:
In the case of merchant's adopting two-step pricing scheme:
In the first period, consumers form expectation about the quality based on the merchant awareness characteristic d and buy the good only if their utility is greater or equal to the price 1 p . Thus, the proportion of consumers buy in the first period is:
In the second period, for consumers who bought the good and knew the true quality, all of them buy if the price 2 p is lower than 1 p , or some of them buy if the price 2 p is greater or equal to 1 p . For consumers who did not buy the good and still maintain the same expectation about the quality as in the first period, none of them buy if the price 2 p is greater or equal to 1 p , or some buy if 2 p is lower than 1 p . Thus, the proportion of consumers buy in the second period is:
Pr( ( , ) ) 0 1 ,
The merchant's revenue function is:
After solving the optimization problem for the revenue with respect to 1 p and 2 p , we get two sets of solutions,:
And the corresponding revenue is: . It implies that the optimal first period price is less than the second period price.
In the case of merchant's offering discounted prices in the first period and full price in the second period:
Consumers form expectation about the quality based on the merchant awareness characteristic d and buy the good only if their utility is greater or equal to the price (1
, none of the consumers who did not buy the good will buy in the second period. For the consumers who bought the good in the first period, only those have higher utility based on the true quality of the good than the price will buy in the second period: 
on the platform.
Proof of Proposition 1:
From merchant's revenue function (3), the 1 st and 2 nd period revenue from the new consumers will be zero when
. Furthermore, from the merchant's revenue function (3), the 2 nd period revenue from the existing consumer will be less if 0
. Thus,
. Therefore, We prove Proposition 1.∎ Lemma 2: When offering a deal on the platform is free, the optimal discount rate on the platform offered by a merchant of type d is
, and
Proof of Lemma 2:
From proposition 1, we show that
. It has three cases.
Case 1 is that
, then the merchant's revenue from the new and existing consumers are
(1 )
, thus the total revenue for the merchant who offers a deal on the platform is:
(1 ) (
; and
and thus the total revenue for the merchant is:
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ),
(
, we take the two FOCs with respect to p d and np d , and we have:
Therefore,
. And the value of d corresponding to the limit is
Case 3: When
, then the merchant's revenue from the new and existing consumers are:
, thus the total revenue for the merchant is:
( 
To combine all three cases, we have:
We prove Lemma 2.∎ Proposition 2: No merchant should offer a discount rate lower than the discount rate offered outside the platform.
Proof of Proposition 2:
From Lemma 2, we show:
. Therefore,
We prove Proposition 2.∎ 
Proof of Proposition 3
From Lemma 2, we show that when 1 0 2 b < < , then the merchants whose
will offer a discount rate on the platform same as outside the platform, 
Therefore, the merchants have no incentive to offer a deal on the platform even when the platform charges zero from transactions. We prove Proposition 3.∎ Proposition 4: When the platform charges a fixed fee for a merchant to offer a deal, the merchants' optimal discount rates on the outside the platform remains the same as given in Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 4:
The merchant's of type d pays a fixed fee, F , to the platform for offering a deal, thus, the merchant's profit function is:
Since the fee is fixed, then the marginal analysis on optimal
is independent of F . Thus, the merchant's optimal discount rates when the platform charges a fixed fee are identical as the optimal discount rate offered in the benchmark case,
We prove Proposition 4.∎ 
Proof of Lemma 3:
We can see that the merchants with smaller d benefit more than merchants with a larger d from Figure 7 . From Lemma 1, we show:
And From Lemma 2, we show:
, so no merchant will offer a deal for any 0 F ³ , as we showed in Proposition 3.
where merchants whose
have higher revenue from offering a deal than no deal after subtracting the fixed fee, then the marginal merchant, 1 ( )
of offering a deal and no deal is:
It follows 
(1 ) ( 
. Therefore, the 2 ( )
is the solution to the equation. And we have: 
should be the same. Thus, we have:
And solve for the equation, we have:
1 8 (1 ) (1 )
We also have: , where
will offer a deal 
Proof of Proposition 5:
From the proof of Lemma 3, we show that the platform's optimal fixed * F is within Thus, we show Proposition 6. ∎ Note: Proposition 6 also implies that all merchants whose optimal discount rate is 1 bd -in the benchmark and fixed fee cost cases, also will offer 1 bd -in this revenue sharing case; however, some merchants whose optimal discount rate is 
